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MIRJANA RAŠEVIĆ 1 
ABSTRACT 
Our understanding of whether, to what 
extent, and under which conditions reli-
gions nowadays influence birth levels 
depends on research. It is important to 
seek answers to two fundamental ques-
tions. The first question is about the role 
of religiosity and religious affiliation in 
the deterministic cause of low fertility and 
family planning in recent times. The sec-
ond question deals with the influence of 
religious institutions on birth levels and 
the exercise of reproductive rights at the 
global level and within certain population 
groups over recent decades. To that end, 
the paper provides an overview of theoret-
ical examinations of the connection be-
tween religions and fertility, empirical 
studies addressing low completed fertility, 
birth control, or sexual behaviour in rela-
tion to religiosity or religious affiliation of 
individuals, as well as the influence of 
religious institutions on fertility transition 
and the respect of human rights in this 
field. A review of the recent studies of 
various populations characterised by low 
birth levels shows that religiosity, espe-
cially practising religion, encourages peo-
ple to uphold traditional values, attitudes, 
and behaviours that are directly or indi-
rectly related to the concepts of marriage 
and childbearing. Moreover, it sheds light 
on some examples of religious institu-
tions’ concrete opposition to progress in 
this area, while also highlighting contra-
dictory cases of religions supporting pro-
found contemporary changes in reproduc-
tive behaviour. 
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Pronatalism has long been a central 
principle in most, if not all religions. 
Accordingly, present-day religions 
also insist on strengthening the tradi-
tional family, maintaining male supe-
riority, encouraging people to have 
children, teaching women that parent-
ing is their only role in life, and pro-
hibiting the use of effective birth con-
trol and voluntary abortion (Norris and 
Inglehart 2004: 23). It is not uncom-
mon for recommendations regarding 
women’s status, adolescents’ health, 
or the choice of birth control to be 
softened in the latest international 
documents, or for their implementa-
tion to be hindered under the pressure 
of religious groups. This is also the 
case with the Programme of Action of 
the Fifth International Conference on 
Population and Development, which is 
the key relevant international policy 
document in the field of population 
research (Rašević and Petrović 1996: 
151). 
THE PHENOMENON OF SUB-
REPLACEMENT FERTILITY 
Childbearing as a positive natural 
component directly influences popula-
tion growth and its age profile. How-
ever, it performs these two significant 
demographic functions only if at least 
enough children are born to meet the 
needs of population replacement. 
Therefore, any birth level that is too 
low to sustain these two functions is 
known as sub-replacement fertility, 
which sooner or later results in popu-
lation decline and excessive popula-
tion ageing. The significance of sub-
replacement fertility is even more 
critical considering that it is a deep-
seated and, consequently, long-
standing phenomenon that takes both 
time and effort to change. In condi-
tions of low population mortality, it is 
the principal natural dynamic factor of 
demographic changes. 
The phenomenon of sub-
replacement fertility is a deep-seated 
one that no developed society has 
been able to escape. However, sub-
replacement fertility doesn’t only af-
fect developed countries, nor is it ex-
clusive to Western civilisation. Ac-
cording to an assessment by the Unit-
ed Nations, this phenomenon today 
affects 83 countries in the world, or 
46% of the global population, includ-
ing the whole European continent, as 
well as some of the most populous 
countries: China, USA, Brazil, Russia, 
Japan, Vietnam, Germany, Iran, Thai-
land, and the United Kingdom. It is 
expected that, by the middle of this 
century, 69% of the world’s popula-
tion will live in countries where wom-
en give birth to fewer than 2.1 chil-
dren on average, which represents the 
theoretical level required for popula-
tion replacement (United Nations 
2017: 6). 
Reproductive behaviour is consid-
ered from the perspective of various 
scientific disciplines, such as econom-
ics, sociology, psychology, anthropol-
ogy, history, ethnology, geography, 
biology, sexology, and demography. 
In this process, as Hobcraft and 
Kiernan argued, economists want to 
answer the question of what limits the 
choices connected to childbearing, 
sociologists wonder why those choices 
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are limited, psychologists analyse the 
influence of preferences, emotions, 
and attitudes on the choices, anthro-
pologists study how the culture ena-
bles or, more likely, limits those 
choices, historians tell us how those 
choices have changed over time, while 
ethnologists dedicate the most atten-
tion to the spatial dimension of the 
choices. Then we have biologists, 
whose principal considerations are 
focused on procreative capacity and 
sterility, while sexologists study the 
influence of the frequency of sexual 
intercourse as a direct fertility factor. 
Demographers analyse the scale of the 
sub-replacement fertility problem and 
its macro-level consequences 
(Hobracft and Kiernan 1995: 2). 
Prevalent studying of this phenom-
enon from the point of view of a sin-
gle scientific discipline is one of the 
reasons why we still do not have one 
comprehensive theory of sub-
replacement fertility despite the series 
of complex considerations – supported 
by statistics, research findings, and 
high applicability – regarding low 
population fertility. As a result, we 
believe the research process focused 
on the comprehensive theoretical dis-
section of the reasons for having one 
or two children will continue in the 
years to come. Nevertheless, many 
important determinants of the sub-
replacement fertility phenomenon 
have already been identified. A special 
place among them is taken by what is 
known as civilisation’s factors. 
The core of contemporary reproduc-
tive behaviour is affected by some of 
the important factors that are intrinsic 
to the present level of each civilisa-
tion’s development, whether they be 
related to its positive achievements or 
to its most serious weaknesses. On one 
hand there is, inter alia, the nuclear 
family and the altered roles of women 
and children within it, different rela-
tionships between partners, strength-
ened individualism, aspirations of self-
actualisation, insistence on the quality 
of one’s own life and the life of chil-
dren, liberal laws on abortion, and the 
availability of efficient birth control. 
On the other hand, there is the materi-
alistic mindset coupled with the con-
sumer mentality, the desire for free 
time, and a personal life that is more 
scattered than ever before. In the new 
system of values, parenthood has re-
mained high on the list. However, its 
essence has changed. Children are 
born primarily to satisfy the psycho-
logical and emotional needs of the 
parents. This is typically achieved 
with one or two children at most 
(Rašević 1999). 
These factors and a series of other 
unaddressed structural, cultural, and 
technological changes are rooted in 
the second global revolution, known 
as modernisation. The industrial revo-
lution, extensive urbanisation, radical 
changes in agriculture, science, and 
technology, the revolution of the edu-
cation system, medicine, and the polit-
ical system, including secularisation, 
are the most significant changes with-
in the entire process. The demographic 
revolution is, however, a consequence 
of said changes. Country-to-country 
variations of the demographic revolu-
tion indicator values are related to the 
time factor or, alternatively, to the 
socioeconomic context and/or the 
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cultural identity of the population, 
which, to a greater or lesser extent, 
influence individual choices regarding 
parenthood. 
Where analyses of the causes of low 
fertility rates mention the influence of 
religions, this is principally done in a 
way that stresses that childbearing has 
become a seemingly free choice of 
individuals in the conditions of weak-
ening moral pressures of various 
kinds. As the disparities between the 
birth rates of individuals of different 
levels of religiosity or wealth has de-
creased in developed countries, so 
have demographers become less inter-
ested in studying the influence of reli-
gions on reproductive behaviour. 
Could the interest in this old issue be 
awakening again in theoretical consid-
erations and empirical studies? Our 
understanding of whether, to what 
extent, and under which conditions 
religions nowadays influence birth 
levels depends on the inclusion of this 
topic in research efforts. 
INFLUENCE OF RELIGIONS 
ON FERTILITY LEVELS 
Aim of the paper 
The paper seeks answers to two ques-
tions. The first question is about the 
role of religiosity and religious affilia-
tion in the deterministic cause of low 
fertility and family planning in recent 
times. To that end, the paper provides 
an overview of theoretical examina-
tions of the influence of religions on 
birth levels and the findings of the 
most relevant empirical studies con-
ducted in recent years, addressing low 
completed fertility, birth control, or 
sexual behaviour in relation to the 
religiosity or religious affiliation of 
individuals. It also addresses the influ-
ence of religious institutions on birth 
levels and the exercise of reproductive 
rights within certain population groups 
over recent decades. 
Methodology 
The review of studies relevant to this 
paper focused principally on articles 
published between 2004 and 2018 in a 
large number of journals in the field of 
demography. It also included a search 
of the titles and key words of articles 
in journal databases available through 
the National Library of Serbia and the 
KoBSON programme, published in 
Serbian, English, or any other lan-
guage with a summary in English. 
Furthermore, the author of this pa-
per took into account the findings of 
other papers presented at the last two 
major population conferences, which 
are accessible online. These were the 
28th International Population Confer-
ence, held in Cape Town, South Afri-
ca, from 29 October to 3 November 
2017 (IUSSP 2017) and the European 
Population Conference, organised in 
Brussels, Belgium, from 6–9 June 
2018 (EAPS 2018). By far the least 
popular topic at the global population 
forum – with four papers in total – 
was the theme of culture, religion, 
language, and demographic behav-
iours (IUSSP 2018: 3).  
The selected methodology has sev-
eral limitations. The paper’s most 
important limitation is the fact that it 
considers only demography journals, 
although the article about the connec-
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tion between religiosity and fertility 
could have been published in journals 
associated primarily with other scien-
tific disciplines. We are confident that 
this limitation has been mitigated by 
the openness of demography to the 
findings of research conducted in re-
lated scientific disciplines. On the 
other hand, this study did not take into 
account books or submissions for pro-
ceedings that deal with the same topic 
we are exploring. 
Findings 
Using the method described above, we 
came across a pertinent theoretical 
reflection in the article by Kevin 
McQuillan entitled, “When Does Re-
ligion Influence Fertility?” In response 
to the central question of this article, 
the author emphasises three elements. 
First, the religion in question must 
articulate behavioural norms that have 
links to fertility outcomes. Second, a 
religious group must possess the 
means to communicate its teachings to 
its members and to enforce compli-
ance. Finally, religious groups are 
more likely to influence the demo-
graphic choices of their followers 
when members feel a strong sense of 
attachment to the religious community 
(McQuillan 2004: 49-50). This reflec-
tion could have been used as a theoret-
ical framework, or quoted in discus-
sions on the findings of most of the 
empirical studies that we will present. 
Conversely to theoretical examina-
tions, there have recently been several 
empirical studies focusing on the in-
fluence of religions on reproductive 
behaviour. We have placed special 
emphasis on the results of the follow-
ing analyses, which were based on 
various data sources and related to 
various population groups. 
1. As a rule, population censuses 
are the primary source of information 
about the religious affiliation (or lack 
thereof) of individuals in former so-
cialist countries. The research whose 
findings we are presenting looked for 
a connection between the number of 
children a woman had and her reli-
gious affiliation (or lack thereof) 
based on the results of the 2011 Popu-
lation Census in the Czech Republic.  
The findings of the descriptive 
analysis showed that the largest aver-
age number of live births, at the gen-
eration-replacement level, was found 
among women past their fertile years 
who declared themselves as Catholics, 
members of other Christian denomina-
tions, or of non-Christian religions. 
One in three women aged 45 or older 
in these three religious cohorts had 
given birth to three, four, or five chil-
dren, compared to only one in five 
atheist women (Růžičková and Ham-
plová 2016: 217). 
The findings of the regression anal-
ysis, conducted in the second phase of 
the research to assess the average 
number of children per woman when 
taking into account age, civil status, 
education, and place of residence, 
showed that these disparities in fertili-
ty levels related to women’s religiosity 
disappeared when the respondents’ 
civil status was considered (Růžičková 
and Hamplová 2016: 221). 
At the same time, it was identified 
that there were minor differences in 
the average number of live births 
among highly educated women of 
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various religious affiliations who were 
past their fertile years (Růžičková and 
Hamplová 2016: 222).  
2. Many European countries con-
duct longitudinal representative sur-
veys that include questions about re-
spondents’ childbearing history, the 
history of partner relationships, socio-
economic variables, as well as about 
their religious affiliation and how 
frequently they attend religious ser-
vices. Examples of surveys of this 
type include the Generations and Gen-
der Survey, coordinated by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, and the British Household 
Panel Survey. These two data sources 
were used in analysing the completed 
fertility of women of various age co-
horts born between 1930 and 1979 in 
three highly secular Western European 
countries: the United Kingdom, 
France, and the Netherlands. Specifi-
cally, the results of the 2005 Genera-
tions and Gender Survey were used 
for France and the Netherlands, while 
those of the 2010 British Household 
Panel Survey were used for Great 
Britain.  
The cumulative fertility rates of 
women who identified as Catholics, 
Protestants, or atheists were analysed. 
The study either confirmed or partially 
confirmed the initial hypotheses, find-
ing that: 
• religious women who regularly 
attend church (at least once a 
month) on average have more 
children than religious women 
who attend church less often or 
not at all; 
• nominally religious women have 
more children on average than 
atheist women;  
• identified religiosity-related dif-
ferences in fertility rates are in-
creasing among younger age co-
horts in France and the Nether-
lands;  
• religious women have children 
more often than atheists, and this 
difference is increasing among 
younger age cohorts; 
• religious women less often give 
birth to children outside of mar-
riage than atheist women, and 
this difference is increasing 
among younger age cohorts (Peri-
Rotem 2016: 257).  
3. The results of the Generations 
and Gender Survey, conducted in 
France in 2005 in order to identify the 
connection between religious practice 
and the reproductive behaviour of 
various age cohorts, were also ana-
lysed in a slightly different way. 
Namely, comparisons of behaviour 
were made among four population 
subgroups, selected based on their 
level of participation in religious prac-
tice, in each of the cohorts. According 
to the results, the more frequent at-
tenders, who reported a religious affil-
iation and whose attendance of reli-
gious services was at or above the 
median frequency of their cohort, re-
mained more strongly attached to mar-
riage and less often experienced sev-
eral successive unions. They also had 
more children: among women who 
were born in 1960 and had ever been 
married, more frequent attenders had 
0.6 children more than the others. 
Women practising a religion other 
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than Catholicism, notably Muslim 
women, were not responsible for the 
whole of this difference, since the 
more frequently practising Catholics 
had 0.5 more children than the others 
(Régnier-Lolier and Prioux 2008: 4).  
4. The European Social Survey is 
an important source of information for 
exploring individual attitudes, beliefs, 
and models of behaviour throughout 
Europe. The study we are presenting 
used data from the third wave of the 
European Social Survey, conducted in 
2006 on a sample of more than 43,000 
respondents living in 226 regions of 
25 European countries, searching for 
the connection between being a Chris-
tian and one’s attitudes towards di-
vorce, cohabitation, and having chil-
dren outside of marriage. The results 
support the conclusion that it is the 
level of an individual’s religiosity 
(rather than the specific Christian de-
nomination – Catholicism, Protestant-
ism, or Eastern Orthodoxy) and the 
level of religiosity of the environment 
in which an individual lives that are 
important for maintaining individual 
traditional views about marriage 
(Rijken and Liefbroer 2018). 
5. Drawing on the data from three 
surveys on sexuality conducted in 
France in 1970, 1992, and 2006, an 
analysis of the sexual behaviour of 
Catholics and Muslims was undertak-
en. The analysis shows that the differ-
ence between the practicing Catholics 
and the non-religious subpopulation in 
terms of several aspects of sexual be-
haviour, including masturbation, use 
of birth control, and interest in por-
nography, is nowadays decreasing 
(Maudet 2017: 709). However, wom-
en who practice these two religious 
engage in early sexual intercourse less 
often than atheist women. Namely, 
according to the survey conducted in 
2006, 25% of Catholic and 14% of 
Muslim women aged 18–29 years had 
had their first sexual intercourse be-
fore turning 18, compared to 40% of 
atheist women of the same age (Mau-
det 2017: 713). Moreover, compared 
to non-religious people, Catholics and 
Muslims are much more likely to con-
sider homosexual relationships to be a 
manifestation of abnormal sexuality, 
i.e. a psychological problem (Maudet 
2017: 715). 
6. The analysis of birth rates, mor-
tality rates, population growth rates, 
and population sizes in five Serbian 
municipalities of various religious 
profiles in the period from 1961 to 
2001 indicated clear demographic 
development disparities between the 
total Muslim and Christian cultural 
and religious cohorts, resulting pri-
marily from the dichotomous repro-
duction model characterised at the 
same time by both sub-replacement 
fertility (Christians) and high fertility 
(Muslims). However, the finding that 
populations of different municipalities 
within the Muslim cohort were charac-
terised by distinct disparities in terms 
of reproductive behaviour between 
Albanians and Bosnian Muslims from 
the early 1970s led the author to en-
quire whether the influence of religion 
might have been used to steer the pop-
ulation development of a part of that 
cohort. Namely, birth rates in the con-
sidered period remained at a high level 
among the Albanian population, while 
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they declined among Bosnian Mus-
lims (Radovanović 2004: 111). 
Many authors have emphasised the 
role of religious institutions in the 
deceleration or acceleration of fertility 
transition. They have stressed, for 
instance, that the socioeconomic de-
velopment in the latter part of the 20th 
century did not incite the expected 
quicker decline of birth levels in Ko-
sovo & Metohija as a result of the 
preserved traditional views about the 
position and role of women in the 
family, under the authoritative pres-
sure of local public opinion (Рашевич 
2010: 108). On the other hand, they 
highlighted the significance of support 
from religious institutions and leaders 
in efficiently implementing family 
planning programmes in Islamic coun-
tries such as Tunisia, Indonesia 
(Rašević 1996: 12, 16), and Iran 
(Devedžić 2006: 19). It is important to 
underscore that, even today, religious 
institutions are trying to restrict sexual 
and reproductive rights globally and at 
the level of individual populations. An 
example of this is one of the most 
restrictive laws on abortion in Europe, 
which was adopted under the powerful 
influence of the Catholic Church in 
Poland (Heinen and Portet 2010). 
*** 
A review of the recent studies of vari-
ous populations characterised by low 
birth levels shows that religiosity, 
especially the practising of religion, 
encourages people to uphold tradition-
al values, attitudes, and behaviours 
that are directly or indirectly related to 
the concepts of marriage and 
childbearing. Despite the ongoing 
process of internal secularisation, peo-
ple who practice a religion clearly 
have more children on average. Re-
productive behaviour differences be-
tween religious and non-religious in-
dividuals are increasing in younger 
cohorts. At the same time, the influ-
ence of religious institutions on the 
exercising of sexual and reproductive 
rights of individuals should not be 
neglected at the global level, nor at the 
level of individual countries. There are 
examples of religious institutions 
counteracting civilisation’s trends, as 
well as contrary examples of support 
provided to the inevitable changes in 
this sphere. 
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Religije i nizak fertilitet danas 
MIRJANA RAŠEVIĆ 1  
REZIME 
Fenomen nedovoljnog rađanja dece je 
duboko uslovljen proces sa kojim se danas 
suočava gotovo polovina svetske popula-
cije. U osnovi savremenog reproduktivnog 
ponašanja nalaze se neki od bitnih faktora 
koji su imanentni sadašnjem nivou razvoja 
civilizacije, bilo da predstavljaju njena 
pozitivna dostignuća ili njene izrazite 
slabosti. Ako se u razmatranjima o uzro-
cima niskog fertiliteta i pominje uticaj 
religija, to se čini pre svega naglašavajući 
da je rađanje dece postalo naizgled slobo-
dan izbor pojedinca u uslovima slabljenja 
moralnih pritisaka različite prirode. 
Sa smanjenjem razlika između nivoa 
rađanja prema stepenu religioznosti poje-
dinca ili partnera u razvijenim zemljama, 
slabio je interes demografa za izučava-
njem uticaja religija na reproduktivno 
ponašanje. Da li se obnavlja interesovanje 
za ovo staro pitanje u teorijskim razmatra-
njima i empirijskim istraživanjima? Uvid 
da li, koliko i pod kojim uslovima religije 
utiču na fertilitet u današnje vreme zavisi 
od otvaranja ove teme među istraživači-
ma. Otuda je važno sagledati odgovore na 
dva osnovna pitanja. Prvo pitanje se odno-
si na ulogu religioznosti i konfesionalnosti 
u determinističkoj osnovi niskog fertiliteta 
i planiranja porodice u novije doba. Drugo 
pitanje se tiče uticaja religioznih instituci-
ja na nivo rađanja i ostvarivanje reproduk-
tivnih prava na globalnom nivou i u okvi-
ru pojedinih populacija poslednjih deceni-
ja. 
U tom smislu, u radu je dat pregled teo-
rijskih preispitivanja veze religija i fertili-
teta, empirijskih istraživanja sa fokusom 
na nizak završeni fertilitet, kontrolu rađa-
nja ili seksualno ponašanje prema religi-
oznosti i konfesionalnosti pojedinca, kao i 
uticaj religijskih institucija na tranziciju 
fertiliteta i poštovanje ljudskih prava u 
ovoj sferi. 
Pregled istraživanja relevantnih za cilj 
rada je prevashodno urađen na osnovu 
članaka objavljenih od 2004. do 2018.  
godine  u većem broju časopisa iz oblasti 
nauke o stanovništvu. Pored toga, konsul-
tovani su on-line dostupni radovi saopšte-
ni na dve poslednje velike populacione 
konferencije. To su XXVIII svetska popu-
laciona konferencija održana 2017. i 
Evropska populaciona konferencija od-
ržana 2018. godine. 
Izabrana metodologija ima više ogra-
ničenja. Najvažnije ograničenje rada od-
nosi se na razmatranje samo demografskih 
časopisa. Verujemo da je ovo ograničenje 
ublaženo otvorenošću demografije za 
nalaze istraživanja iz srodnih naučnih 
disciplina. Takođe, nisu uzeti u obzir 
knjige ili prilozi u zbornicima radova koji 
se tiču ove teme. Pregled istraživanja, 
sprovedenih poslednjih godina u različitim 
populacijama koje karakteriše nizak nivo 
rađanja, pokazuje da religioznost, pogoto-
vo praktikovanje religije, utiče na 
održavanje individualnih tradicionalnih 
vrednosti, stavova i ponašanja koja su 
direktno ili indirektno povezana sa bra-
kom i rađanjem. 
1 Centar za demografska istraživanja, Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd (Srbija) |  
 rasevicm@gmail.com 
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I pored odvijanja procesa unutrašnje 
sekularizacije, osobe koje praktikuju neku 
od religija, u proseku imaju jasno veći 
broj dece. Razlike u reproduktivnom po-
našanju između religioznih i nereligioznih 
osoba povećavaju se u mlađim starosnim 
kohortama. Istovremeno uticaj religijskih 
institucija na ostvarivanje seksualnih i 
reproduktivnih prava pojedinaca nije za-
nemarljiv ni na globalnom nivou, ni na 
nivou pojedinih država. Postoje primeri 
kada religijske institucije koče civili-
zacijske tokove, ali ima i suprotnih prime-
ra vezanih za podršku neminovnim pro-
menama u ovoj sferi. 
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